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Constitutional Law-Pacifica Foundation v. FCC: First Amend-
ment Limitations on FCC Regulation of Offensive Broadcasts
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has enormous power
over broadcasters, and it has not hesitated to use that power to enforce its
own views of what constitutes good radio and television programming.
Among the FCC's goals has been the expurgation of "offensive" language
from the airwaves. To this end, the FCC has used its powers to assess
forfeitures,1 to deny license renewal applications 2 and to exert indirect
pressure on licensees.3 The FCC's efforts have not been limited to obscene
speech. The Commission has argued that the unique nature of the broadcast-
ing medium justifies restrictions, even on speech that does not meet the
Supreme Court's definition of obscenity.4 In Pacifica Foundation v. FCC,5
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed an
FCC order6 prohibiting the broadcast of certain "offensive" words. The
court held that the order violated both the Communications Act of 19347 and
the first amendment. Although the court left open the general question
whether the FCC can ever prohibit the broadcast of nonobscene speech, the
opinions in the case suggest that such Commission action will not be upheld.
On October 30, 1973, radio station WBAI in New York City was
broadcasting its regularly scheduled "Lunchpail" program.8 As part of the
program, the host played a prerecorded monologue called "Filthy Words," 9
1. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1970) authorizes the Commission to assess fines, called "forfei-
tures," against licensees. Such a forfeiture was assessed for the broadcast of indecent language
in WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970).
2. Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C.2d 250 (1962), reconsideration denied, 34
F.C.C.2d 101 (1963), aff'd per curiam on other grounds sub nom. Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d
534 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964).
3. See Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397,407-10 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (Bazelon, C.J., stating why he voted to grant rehearing en banc). The FCC's own proud
description of how it browbeat the networks into adopting the "Family Viewing" period is
found in FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE BROADCAST OF VIOLENT,
INDECENT, AND OBSCENE MATERIAL, 51 F.C.C.2d 418,420-24 (1975). Its tactics on that occasion
were later held to violate the first amendment. Writers Guild of Am., W., Inc. v. FCC, 423 F,
Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
4. See text accompanying notes 120-24 infra.
5. 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 715 (1978) (No. 77-528), rev'g 56
F.C.C.2d 94 (1975).
6. Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975).
7. Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). The
section involved in Pacifica was 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970).
8. This was a live discussion program that focused on a different topic each day. It
involved commentary from a host and discussions between him and listeners who called in. On
that day the topic was contemporary society's attitudes toward language. 56 F.C.C.2d at 95.
9. The monologue was cut five of side two of the album "George Carlin, Occupation:
FOOLE," (Little David Records, LD 1005). It was broadcast at approximately two p.m. on a
Tuesday. Id. A transcript of the monologue appears as an appendix to Judge Leventhal's
dissenting opinion. 556 F.2d at 37 app.
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in which comedian George Carlin discussed "the words you couldn't say on
the public . . . airwaves, . . . the ones you definitely couldn't say,
ever." 10 Because the monologue included numerous repetitions of those
words, WBAI preceded the broadcast with a warning that the language
might offend some listeners.
11
One listener complained to the FCC.12 The FCC responded by issuing
an order banning the broadcast of the words listed by Carlin. 13 It did so on
the authority of 18 U.S.C. § 1464,14 a criminal statute that outlaws the
broadcast of obscene, indecent or profane language. Arguing that the re-
striction would not stifle free speech, the FCC said that few words were
indecent and that even indecent words "conceivably might be broadcast"1
late at night, when children would not be listening.
16
Pacifica Foundation, holder of WBAI's broadcasting license, appealed
the order. The court of appeals reversed the FCC by a vote of two to one.
17
Judge Tamm, who wrote for the court, voted to reverse the order on the
ground that it violated 47 U.S.C. § 326,18 which denies the FCC the power
10. 556 F.2d at 38 (appendix to dissenting opinion of Judge Leventhal). "'The original
seven words were, shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits.'" Id. (quoting
the Carlin monologue, see note 9 supra).
11. /Id. at 11.
12. Id. This listener heard the broadcast while driving in his car with his young son. There
were no other complaints to either the FCC or WBAI. Id.
13. The order declared "that words such as 'fuck,' 'shit,' 'piss,' 'motherfucker,'
'cocksucker,' 'cunt' and 'tit' depict sexual and excretory activities and organs in a manner
patently offensive by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium and are
accordingly 'indecent' when broadcast on radio or television." 56 F.C.C.2d at 99. In a later
clarification, the FCC stated that it would not hold licensees responsible for offensive language
used in live news broadcasts of public events. "Petition for Clarification or Reconsideration"
of a Citizen's Complaint against Pacifica Foundation, 59 F.C.C.2d 892, 893 n.1 (1976).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1970) provides: "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than two years, or both." In addition, 47 id. § 503(b)(1)(E) empowers the Commission
to impose forfeitures on licensees for violations of § 1464.
15. "[D]uring the late evening hours such words conceivably might be broadcast, with
sufficient warning to unconsenting adults provided the-programs in which they are used have
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 56 F.C.C.2d at 100. Elsewhere in its
opinion the Commission stated this exception somewhat differently: "'WThen the number of
children in the audience is reduced to a minimum, for example during the late evening hours, a
different standard might conceivably be used. . . . [W]e would . . . consider whether the
material has serious . . . value .... " Id. at 98. Neither formulation commits the FCC to
making any exception at all. The Commission continued to hedge in "Petition for Clarification
or Reconsideration" of a Citizen's Complaint against Pacifica Foundation, 59 F.C.C.2d 892
(1976): "We intimated that such language could be broadcast. . . when the number of children
in the audience was reduced to a minimum. . . . Having said this, we will not comment on the
various hypothetical situations posed .... " Id. at 893.
16. The declaratory order was not accompanied by any attempt to assess a fine against
WBAI. 56 F.C.C.2d at 99.
17. 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Each judge on the three-judge panel wrote an opinion.
18. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970) provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission
the power of censorship over-the radio communications or signals transmitted by any
radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the
Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio
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of censorship. He noted that the speech in question was not obscene 19 under
the test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Miller v. California,20 but he
did not pass on the Commission's argument that "indecent" speech was not
constitutionally protected. Even if this were so, he concluded, the order was
overbroad and vague.2
In a concurring opinion, Chief Judge Bazelon agreed that section 326
had been violated on its face. 22 Nevertheless, he did not base his decision on
that statute because he thought the scope of the protection afforded by
section 326 was limited to that already provided by the first amendment.
23
He therefore reached the constitutional issue and decided that Carlin's seven
words would have been protected by the first amendment had they been
disseminated through any other medium 24 and that none of the differences
between broadcasting and other media justified greater restrictions on such
language?
5
Judge Leventhal dissented, in part because he interpreted the FCC
order as prohibiting only the reiterated use of the offensive words in the
early afternoon. 26 He thought such regulation valid under Miller,27 espe-
cially when used to protect children who might be in the audience. 28 While
admitting to some discomfort over the inexactness of the order, he
concluded that this was not a serious problem because judicial review was
available to safeguard constitutionally protected speech.
29
Section 1464 lists three kinds of speech that may not be broadcast: the
19. 556 F.2d at 16.
20. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Miller test of obscenity has three elements:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . .;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24.
21. 556 F.2d at 16. The overbreadth arose because the order barred even nonoffensive
uses of the seven words. Id. at 17. Although Judge Tamm declined to attempt to construe the
term "indecent" in § 1464, id. at 15, he apparently assumed that nonoffensive language could
never be indecent.
The fatal vagueness in the order was its failure to define "children'." Id. at 17. Judge Tamm
did not discuss two uncertainties in the Commission's statement of the times during which the
words could not be broadcast. (I) When are there few enough children in the audience? See
notes 102 & 103 and text accompanying notes 100-03 infra. (2) At those times, is the standard
different? See note 15 supra. The order also did not make clear whether it banned only
repetitive use of the seven words. Compare 556 F.2d at 19 n.2 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) with
id. at 31-32 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
22. 556 F.2d at 18-19 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
23. Id. at 20.
24. Id. at 20-24.
25. Id. at 24-30.
26. Id. at 31-32 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 32-33. See also text accompanying notes 74-79 infra.
28. 556 F.2d at 32-35.
29. Id. at 35.
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"obscene," the "indecent" and the "profane." 30 The few reported cases
interpreting "indecent" and "profane" provide little guidance on the mean-
ing of those terms. Although the Supreme Court has made strenuous efforts
over the last two decades to define "obscene," 3 1 it has done so in the
context of printed material and motion pictures rather than radio and televi-
sion broadcasts. The most recent major obscenity case is Miller, which held
that material is obscene if and only if it appeals to the prurient interest,
offensively depicts sexual conduct and lacks serious value.
32
The only reported case upholding a crimifial conviction for broadcast-
ing profanity is Duncan v. United'States.33 In Duncan, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, relying on state cases that viewed
profanity as abuse of religious terms, 34 held profane a radio broadcast that
"used the expression 'By God' irreverently." 35 Thirty-five years later, in
Gagliardo v. United States, 36 the same circuit found no profanity in a
citizens' band radio broadcast that included the words "God damn it."
'37
Duncan was cited but not distinguished with any clarity. 38 In Tailman v.
United States,3 9 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
suggested in dictum that "profane" referred to personal epithets that might
provoke violence or are grossly offensive. 40 This definition might include
30. See note 14 supra.
31. For the history of the Court's struggle to define obscenity, see Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 78-93 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
32. See note 20 supra.
33. 48 F.2d 128 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 863 (1931).
34. Id. at 133. The definitions stated in these nonbroadcasting cases included "[a]ny
words importing an imprecation of divine vengeance or implying divine condemnation, so used
as to constitute a public nuisance," Gaines v. State, 75 Tenn. 410, 411 (1881), and "language
irreverent toward God or holy things," City of Georgetown v. Scurry, 90 S.C. 346, 349,73 S.E.
353, 354 (1912). The Duncan court did not specifically approve any particular definition.
35. 48 F.2d at 134. Defendant-appellant, owner of radio station KVEP in Portland,
Oregon, also "referred to an individual as 'damned,'. . . and. . . announced his intention to
call down the curse of God upon certain individuals." Id. Although this language was used in
the course of an attack on a local school board member, among others, the court did not discuss
whether the first amendment protected the speech.
36. 366 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1966).
37. Id. at 725.
38. The court said, "Since the only words attributed to appellant which could even
remotely be considered as being 'profane' were 'God damn it,' which were . . . uttered in
anger, there is no basis for holding that the language was 'profane' within the meaning of the
statute." Id. This may mean that words uttered in anger are never profane. Another interpreta-
tion was accepted by the Alabama Court of Appeals in reviewing a conviction for disturbing the
peace by profane language. That court cited Duncan and Gagliardo and inferred from them
"that to constitute profanity an accused must imprecate divine vengeance upon an individual
and that while the expression 'God damn you' is considered profanity, 'God damn it' is not."
Baines v. City of Birmingham, 46 Ala. App. 267,271,240 So. 2d 689, 692, cert. denied, 286 Ala.
732, 240 So. 2d 694 (1970), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 403 U.S. 927, rev'd per
curiam on other grounds, 47 Ala. App. 737, 253 So. 2d 58 (1971).
39. 465 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1972).
40. Id. at 286. The comment was dictum because the court found that appellant had been
tried solely for using obscene language and that his language was indeed obscene. Id. at 287.
For this reason, the trial judge had not defined the terms "indecent" and "profane" and
,nnilnnt 'ndd not chnllenee the meanines of those terms. Id. at 286.
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some nonreligious epithets,4 but exclude "God damn you" as being too
mild by today's standards to provoke violence or to be grossly offensive.
There is no authoritative interpretation of the term "indecent" as it is
used in section 1464.42 Both Duncan and Tallman appear to treat "inde-
cent" as synonymous with "obscene." The Duncan court stated the test for
obscenity, discussed several cases applying this test to allegedly obscene
statements and concluded that appellant's language was neither obscene nor
indecent-with no independent analysis of indecency. 43 Nevertheless, Gag-
liardo expressly rejected this interpretation of Duncan.44 That court re-
versed a section 1464 conviction because of the trial judge's failure to define
"indecent" for the jury,45 but offered no guidance as to how it should be
defined after the remand. Petitioner in Tallman challenged the constitution-
ality of the ban on indecent speech. The court upheld section 146446 on the
authority of Roth v. United States,47 in which the Supreme Court held that
obscene material was not protected by the first amendment.48 The reliance
41. But see Stewart v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 321 (D.D.C. 1976) (shout of "m-f-"
at policeman in the District of Columbia is neither provocative of violence nor grossly offen.
sive).
42. See 556 F.2d at 15; 56 F.C.C.2d at 97.
43. 48 F.2d at 132-33.
44. 366 F.2d at 725 n.7.
45. Id. at 725.
46. 465 F.2d at 285.
47. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
48. The statutes upheld by the Court in Roth (and in its companion case, Alberts v.
California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)) resembled § 1464 in that they were not confined to "obscene"
material. One was a federal statute that prohibited the mailing of "[e]very obscene, lewd,
lascivious, or filthy book." Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1461, 62 Stat. 683 (formerly codified
as 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1952)) (amended 1955). The other, a California law, made it a misdemeanor
to keep for sale "any obscene or indecent . . . book." Law of April 17, 1952, ch. 23, § 4(3),
1953 Cal. Stats., 1952 1st Extraordinary Sess. 380 (formerly codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 311
(West 1955)) (amended 1969). Nevertheless, the opinions considered only the constitutional
status of obscene material. In Roth, the trial judge's instructions to the jury gave the words
'obscene," "lewd" and "lascivious" a single meaning, one that the Court approved. 354 U.S.
at 486. The trial judge's definition of "filthy," however, distinguished that term from "ob-
scene," saying that obscene material promoted impure thoughts while filthy material aroused
revulsion. 237 F.2d 796, 799 (2d Cir. 1956). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit had rejected defendant's challenge to this definition of "filthy" because that court
thought the definition correct and because defendant had not raised the issue at trial. Id. at 799-
800. The definition is apparently inconsistent with the Supreme Court's insistence on appeal to
the prurient interest. See 354 U.S. at 487-88. In rejecting the vagueness challenge to the terms in
the statute, the Court said, "These words, applied according to the proper standard forjudging
obscenity, . . . give adequate warning of the conduct proscribed. ... Id. at 491 (emphasis
added). Presumably, either Roth did not press the contention that he might have been uncon-
stitutionally convicted for mailing a filthy but nonobscene book, or the Supreme Court agreed
with the Second Circuit that he had waived this objection.
The California state courts' interpretations of the state law challenged in Alberts had not
distinguished between "obscene" and "indecent" material. See People v. Alberts, 138 Cal.
App. 2d 909, 911, 292 P.2d 90, 91 (1955). The California definition of the phrase "obscene or
indecent" met the United States Supreme Court's requirements for the definition of "ob-
scene." 354 U.S. at 486. Thus neither Roth nor Alberts required the Court to consider the
constitutionality of censoring nonobscene material.
The Court has indicated its willingness to construe federal statutes using "indecent" (or
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on Roth suggests that the Tallman court considered the obscene to be the
same as the indecent, but the decision was on the ground of obscenity.4 9
The Federal Communications Act empowers the FCC to assess forfei-
tures against licensees who violate section 1464.50 In the absence of a
judicial definition of "indecent," the FCC has developed its own interpreta-
tion. The leading case is WUHY-FM.5' The Commission assessed a forfei-
ture against a Philadelphia radio station, WUHY-FM, because it had broad-
cast a prerecorded interview in which the words "shit" and "fucking" were
apparently used frequently. 52 While conceding that the broadcast was not
obscene, 53 the FCC held it to be indecent.54 The opinion defined the term
"indecent" to mean that "the material broadcast is (a) patently offensive by
contemporary community standards; and (b) is utterly without redeemiig
social value." 55 This standard simply restated the then-prevailing definition
of obscenity, as announced in Memoirs v. Massachusetts,56 minus the first
element of that definition: appeal to the prurient interest. The Commission
found this broadcast patently offensive, although neither the FCC nor the
similar words) as encompassing only the obscene, should such construction be necessary to
avoid constitutional problems. See United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8Mm. Film, 413
U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973). This limiting construction was actually applied to an amended version
of the unmailable-matter statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970), in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S.
87, 114 (1974), to avoid vagueness problems. Judge Bazelon has interpreted Hamling as
requiring a similar construction of § 1464 "by necessary implication." Illinois Citizens Comm.
for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397,418 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Bazelon, C.J., stating why he
voted to grant rehearing en banc). The Supreme Court has never heard a case arising under §
1464. When it does, § 1464 could be distinguished from § 1461 on the ground that the FCC, by
taking care to set out its interpretation of "indecent," see text accompanying note 55 infra, has
sufficiently clarified that term to save § 1464 from unconstitutional vagueness. Of course, it
could still be unconstitutional for overbreadth, see text accompanying notes 69-139 infra, and
any particular order issued under it could be unconstitutionally vague.
49. See note 40 supra.
50. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(E) (1970).
51. 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970). This case is occasionally cited as Eastern Education(al)
Radio.
52. The broadcast was the January 4, 1970, edition of a weekly program, "Cycle II,"
described by the station as "concerned with the avant-garde movement in music, publications,
art, film, personalities, and other forms of social and artistic experimentation." The program
was designed to reach college students and other "alienated" young people. Letter from
WUHY-FM to FCC (Feb. 12, 1970), quoted in 24 F.C.C.2d at 408 n.l. It aired at 10 p.m.
Sunday. 24 F.C.C.2d at 408. The FCC objected to such usages as "S-t man" and "Political
change is so f- g slow." Id. at 409. See also id. at 416-17 (excerpts from interview
transcript).
53. 24 F.C.C.2d at 412.
54. Id. at 414.
55. Id. at 412.
56. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen.,
383 U.S. 413 (1966). This case is frequently cited simply as Memoirs v. Massachusetts. The
Memoirs standard was that
three elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is
patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to
the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly
without redeeming social value.
Id. at 418.
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station had received any complaints about it from listeners.57 It also found
the broadcast to be without redeeming social value, although the dissenters
argued that such language was important as a reflection of the culture and
life style of disaffected young people. 58
The WUHY opinion paid little attention to possible first amendment
problems, because of what the FCC called the "vital consideration ' 59 that
judicial review was available to protect freedom of speech. No such review
was sought in WUHY. The FCC's definition of "indecent" has been
challenged in only one reported case.' On that occasion the United States
Court of Appeals for the listrict of Columbia upheld the assessment of a
forfeiture because it found the broadcast in question obscene, and thus did
not reach the issue of indecency.
6'
Judge Tamm's opinion in Pacifica also did not reach this issue.
Dispositive of the case for Judge Tamm was the statutory prohibition against
censorship in section 326.62 He considered and rejected the FCC's argument
that its order merely "channeled" speech.63 Holding that the order censored
speech, he concluded that it violated section 326 and was therefore invalid,
whatever the constitutional status of the speech sought to be suppressed.64
57. 24 F.C.C.2d at 409 n.2. The FCC apparently made no effort to determine the commu-
nity's reaction to such language. Id. at 423 (Johnson, Comm'r, preliminarily dissenting).
58. Commissioner Johnson quoted Professor Ashley Montagu's belief that swearing has
social value. Id. at 424 (Johnson, Comm'r, preliminarily dissenting). Commissioner Cox
thought young people used such language partly because "it is intended to show disrespect for
the standards of their elders, which they regard as outmoded, without real basis, and 'irrelev-
ant.'" Id. at 419 (Cox, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part). He also accepted the
station's contention that " '[tlhe challenged language . . reflected the personality and life
style of' " the interviewee, Jerry Garcia, the leader of the rock band "The Grateful Dead." Id.
(quoting letter from WUHY-FM to FCC, supra note 52). Some of Commissioner Cox's
arguments show a concern, not that the language per se had social value, but that the necessity
of keeping it off the air would impair the social value of the rest of the program. "It might have
been difficult for Mr. Garcia to change his habits of speech without interfering with the flow of
his ideas-or he might simply have refused to give the interview at all on those terms." Id. at
419. Deleting offensive words would be such an inconvenience to the station that it might well
choose not to interview such people at all. Id. at 420-21.
59. Id. at 415.
60. Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 27 RADIo REG. 2d (P & F) 285, reconsideration denied,
41 F.C.C.2d 777 (1973), aff'd sub nom. Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515
F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See also Apparent Liability of Station WGLD-FM, 41 F.C.C.2d 919
(1973) (texts of FCC news release on, and Comm'r Johnson's dissent in, Sonderling).
61. Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 403 n.14 (D.C. Cir.
1975). The Commission had applied the WUHY definition of indecency to an explicit discus-
sion of oral sex. "Femme Forum," a live call-in program, was broadcast every weekday from
10 a.m. to 3 p.m. on WGLD-FM, Oak Park, Illinois. Id. at 401. On February 23, 1973, the
subject discussed was oral sex. Women in the audience called the station and described their
own oral sex experiences in explicit terms. Id. The FCC held that the broadcast was obscene
under the Memoirs test, id. at 403-04, and added, as an alternative ground for the decision, that
the broadcast was also indecent under the WUHY test, id. at 403 n. 14. There is no indication in
the FCC or court of appeals opinions that any of the words later proscribed in Pacifica were
used. The alleged indecency arose strictly from the subject matter and what was said about it.
62. 556 F.2d at 15.
63. Id. at 13.
64. Id. at 15.
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This position, however, gives no effect to section 1464 or to the FCC's
power to enforce that section. 65 The language of section 1464 was originally
enacted as the second sentence of section 326 of the Communications Act of
1934.66 Because Congress, when it banned censorship, simultaneously
banned the broadcast of certain speech and later gave the FCC the power to
enforce the latter ban, 67 the categories of speech so proscribed must be
considered exceptions to the statutory rule that the FCC may not engage in
censorship.
68
The major issue raised by Pacifica is the extent to which the first
amendment prohibits the FCC from censoring offensive speech. The
Commission could, as it did in Sonderling Broadcasting Corp. ,69 defend
the constitutionality of a given restriction in two ways. First, it could argue
that the particular broadcast in question was not protected speech because it
fell within one of the currently recognized exceptions to the first amend-
ment's coverage, such as obscene speech 70 or "fighting" words. 7' Second,
the Commission could argue that the courts should withhold constitutional
protection from a newly recognized category of unprotected speech, the
indecent, which might be limited to broadcast speech.72
The FCC apparently did not consider the first argument applicable to
the facts of Pacifica, as it did not consider the Carlin monologue obscene.
73
Judge Leventhal, however, thought that the monologue could be included
within Miller's expanded definition of obscenity. 74 The Miller Court in-
cluded in its opinion an example of a standard a state legislature might
constitutionally adopt: "Patently offensive representations or descriptions
of . . .excretory functions." ' 75 The Court offered this as an acceptable
standard for defining "patently offensive," the second of the three elements
65. See note 14 supra.
66. Ch. 652, § 326, 48 Stat. 1064 (presently codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1,164 (1970); 47 id. §
326). This sentence was shifted to Title 18 in 1948 as part of the revision of the United States
Criminal Code. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1464, 62 Stat. 683 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1464
(1970)).
67. Communications Act Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-752, § 7a, 74 Stat. 889
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1970)).
68. Chief Judge Bazelon thought it unclear how much power the FCC had under 47 U.S.C.
§ 503(b)(1)(E) (1970); see note I supra. 556 F.2d at 20 n.7 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). Although
he cited that section and § 1464, he rejected Judge Tamm's argument for a different reason. He
thought that Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
limited § 326 so that it provided no greater protection of offensive speech than did the first
amendment. See 556 F.2d at 20 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
69. 27 RADIO REG. 2d (P & F) 285, reconsideration denied, 41 F.C.C.2d 777 (1973), aff'd
sub nom. Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
70. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 485.
71. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
72. See 556 F.2d at 24 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). These two alternatives are not exclu-
sive.
73. 56 F.C.C.2d at 94-95.
74. 556 F.2d at 32-33 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
75. 413 U.S. at 25.
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of obscenity.7 6 Judge Leventhal, however, interpreted it as an acceptable
standard for defining "obscene" and thought that Miller therefore au-
thorized the expansion of the concept of obscenity to include material not
appealing to the prurient interest. 77 Judge Bazelon disagreed, reading Miller
as requiring appeal to the prurient interest whether or not there was offensive
representation of excretory functions. 78 Judge Leventhal's interpretation, if
accepted, would have major consequences for FCC regulation of offensive
speech: regulation would be constitutional even without a finding of appeal
to the prurient interest and, presumably, even without a finding of lack of
serious value.
79
The FCC's opinion in Pacifica abandoned the obscenity argument. It
rested on a finding of fact that the Carlin monologue was indecent8° and on
the legal theory, first applied in WUHY, that nonobscene but indecent
broadcasts could constitutionally be banned. 81 The Commission departed
from the WUHY definition of indecency, however, by changing its second
element-that "the material broadcast . . . [be] utterly without redeeming
social value. "82 Some revision was clearly justified in light of Miller. The
obvious change would have been to require, as the second element, that the
material broadcast lack serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value. 83 Instead, the Commission went much further and greatly weakened,
76. After setting out the three-part standard, see note 20 supra, the Court said, "It is
possible . . . to give a few plain examples of what a state statute could define for regulation
under part (b) of the standard announced in this opinion, supra: . . . (b) Patently offensive
representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the
genitals." 413 U.S. at 25.
77. The pre-Miller rulings had always defined "obscene" in terms of what appeals to
the lewd and prurient interest . . . . But Miller expanded on this-to include "pat-
ently offensive representations or descriptions of . . . excretory functions."
This is in substance a stretch of the prohibition to go beyond the lewd obscene to the
excretory indecent.
556 F.2d at 32-33 (Leventhal, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
78. Id. at 21 n.II (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
79. Judge Leventhal limited his argument in Pacifica to the contention that appeal to the
prurient interest is not a necessary element of obscenity. See note 77 supra. He did not say
whether lack of serious value remains an element. Nevertheless, his logic seems to imply that it
does not. Assuming that "offensive representations or descriptions of excretory functions" is
an example merely of patent offensiveness, the second Miller element, see note 20 supra, such
representations do not necessarily satisfy the requirement that the material appeal to the
prurient interest, the first element, see id. Miller made clear that the conjunction of all three
elements is necessary to a finding of obscenity. Therefore, Judge Leventhal's argument is
sound only if "offensive representations or descriptions of excretory functions" is an example
of obscenity. In that case there need be no additional proof either of appeal to the prurient
interest or of lack of serious value.
80. 56 F.C.C.2d at 99.
81. Id. at 97-98.
82. WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d at 412; see text accompanying note 55 supra.
83. See note 20 supra. The second element of the WUHY definition of indecency was
modeled on the third element of the Memoirs definition of obscenity. See text accompanying
note 56 supra. Since Miller changed the latter, 413 U.S. at 24-25, it would have been appropri-
ate for the FCC to change the former to maintain the parallelism.
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perhaps eliminated, 84 the requirement that the banned broadcast be value-
less. It held that "when children may be in the audience, [indecent
language] cannot be redeemed by a claim that it has literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. "85 The FCC argued 86 that this approach did not
violate the first amendment because of the Supreme Court's holding in
Ginsberg v. New York. 87 In Ginsberg, the Court upheld the conviction of a
newsdealer who had sold two "girlie" magazines to a sixteen-year-old boy.
The magazines would not have been considered obscene for adults. The
statute under which the newsdealer had been convicted prohibited the sale to
minors of material meeting the statutory definition of "harmful to
minors."
88
The FCC did not discuss two important differences between the hold-
ing in Ginsberg and its own Pacifica rule. The first is that Ginsberg still
requires a finding that the challenged material be obscene as to children.
Ginsberg was decided in 1968, when the prevailing standard of obscenity
was that set forth in Memoirs.89 The New York statute upheld by the
Ginsberg Court simply added the words "of minors" or "for minors" to
each of the three parts of the Memoirs definition of obscenity. 90 In particu-
lar, the statutory proscription applied only to material that was "utterly
without redeeming social importance for minors.'"91 Although the Supreme
Court has not yet had occasion to consider the impact of Miller on the
84. The "definition of 'indecent' language in WUHY. . . is clarified by eliminating the
test 'utterly without redeeming social value' which the Supreme Court modified in Miller
... " FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, supra -note 3, at 425 (discussing Pacifica)
(emphasis added).
85. 56 F.C.C.2d at 98 (footnote omitted). The WUHY definition of "indecent," omitting
appeal to the prurient interest as an element, has never been passed on by a court. See text
accompanying notes 60 & 61 supra. The FCC's Pacifica rule goes beyond WUHYby disallow-
ing the defense of redeeming social value. But see note 15 supra.
86. 56 F.C.C.2d at 98 n.6.
87. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
88. See note 90 infra.
89. See note 56 supra.
90. The statute read:
"Harmful to minors" means that quality of any description or representation, in
whatever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sadomasochistic
abuse, when it:
(i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors;
and
(ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a
whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors; and
(iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.
Law of June 7, 1965, ch. 327, § 1, 1965 N.Y. Laws 1066 (formerly codified as N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 484-h(1)(f) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1966)) (repealed 1967) (current version at N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 235.20(6) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1977-1978)).
"Harmful to minors," so defined, was made an element in a finding that the sale of the
material to minors was prohibited. Law of June 14, 1965, ch. 372, § 1, 1965 N.Y. Laws 1135
(formerly codified as N.Y. PENAL LAWS § 484-i (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1966)) (repealed 1967)
(current version at N.Y. PENAL LAWS § 235.21 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1977-1978)).
91. Law of June 7, 1965, ch. 327, sec. 1, § 484-h(l)(f)(iii), 1965 N.Y. Laws 1066 (repealed
1967), quoted in note 90 supra.
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definition of obscenity for children,92 it is not difficult to envision the new
test. It would stand in the same relationship to the Miller test as the
Ginsberg test did to that of Memoirs, and thus would require that the
material lack serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value for chil-
dren. 93 Ginsberg, therefore, does not support the FCC's refusal to consider
the possible redeeming value of an offensive broadcast.
The second major problem with the FCC's reliance on Ginsberg is that
broadcasting reaches adults as well as children. In Butler v. Michigan ,9 the
Supreme Court overturned the conviction of a defendant who had sold books
not suitable for minors. The actual purchaser was an adult (a plainclothes
policeman), but the statute barred the sale of such materials to anyone. 95 The
state's contention that the materials were unsuitable for minors was not
disputed. Nevertheless, the Court found the statute unconstitutional because
it "reduce[d] the adult population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for
children." 96 The Ginsberg Court was careful to distinguish Butler by
pointing out that the New York statute barred only sales to minors. 97 With
regard to material that is not obscene for adults but is obscene for children,
'therefore, the first amendment allows a ban on distribution to children
(Ginsberg) but prohibits a ban on distribution to adults (Butler). This
doctrine is easily applied to printed materials. Because each copy of a book
or magazine is sold to one purchaser, print media allow for what could be
called the discrete distribution of obscene material.98 Broadcasting, on the
other hand, reaches many people simultaneously. A court reviewing a
restriction on the broadcasting of Ginsberg-type material must accept one of
two unattractive alternatives: either the first amendment protects the distri-
bution to children of material that is obscene for them or it does not protect
the distribution to adults of material that is not obscene for them. The same
92. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 42 2 U.S. 205, 213 n.10 (1975).
93. The other two elements would be (a)whether the average person, applying contempo.
rary community standards, would find that the w9fk, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest of minors, and (b) whether the Work depicts or describes in a way patently offensive to
minors sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law. See note 20 supra; cf.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20 (McKinney 1967 & Cum. Supp. 1977-1978) (similar wording in 1974
amendment to New York law).
94. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
95. The statute read in part, "Any person who shall .. . sell .. .any book . ..
containing obscene, immoral, lewd or lascivious language ...tending to incite minors to
violent or depraved or immoral acts, manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of
youth, . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Law of May 15, 1953, Pub. Act No. 74, 1953
Mich. Pub. Acts 71 (formerly codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.343 (MICH. STAT. ANN. §
28.575 (Callaghan 1954))) (repealed 1957).
96. 352 U.S. at 383.
97. 390 U.S. at 6344,5.
98. Cf. Classroom lecture by Professor Harry Kalven, University of Chicago Law School
(Apr. 15, 1974) (class notes of James Beckwith, Assistant Professor of Law, North Carolina
Central University) (copy on file in office of North Carolina Law Review). Professor Beckwith
believes Professor Kalven used the word "discreet"--i.e., circumspect or prudent-as op-
posed to "discrete"-i.e., individually distinct.
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problem arises whenever the content of a broadcast is regulable with respect
to only a part of the broadcast audience.
99
The unattractiveness of the second alternative is diminished, the FCC
argued in Pacifica, by the nature of the order's restriction on offensive
words. Such language was not totally excluded from the airwaves; rather, it
was "channeled"00 into those time periods when fewer children would be
exposed to it. WUHY was based in part on protecting children from
exposure to offensive language aired between 10 and 11 p.m., 1° t so the
restricted language might well be banned until 11 p.m. or even later. 0 2 By
prohibiting such broadcasts during most of the day, the FCC's order im-
posed a substantial burden on constitutionally protected speech.
0 3
Because of these two differences between Ginsberg and Pacifica, the
FCC's censorship of offensive broadcasts would represent a significant
extension of Ginsberg, one not justified by the Ginsberg Court's reasoning.
The first reason the Ginsberg Court gave for affirming the conviction was
that parents have a traditional right to control their children's upbringing. 104
Some parents would not want their children to read pornography, and the
New York statute helped them enforce that desire. 105 The Court took care to
point out that other parents were free to buy the magazines themselves and
give them to their children. 106 Restrictions on the content of broadcasts,
however, leave no room for parental choice. The Court's other basis for
99. The basis for regulating the Carlin monologue would be indecency rather than obsceni-
ty. The FCC opinion leaves open the possibility that the monologue would be regulable even
with respect to adults. See 56 F.C.C.2d at 98. If it were, the problem of indiscreteness would be
avoided entirely. The problem would also be avoided if the mon6logue, because of its serious
value, were held to be nonregulable even with respect to children. See text accompanying notes
89-93 supra.
100. 56 F.C.C.2d at 98. The Commission analogized the regulation of offensive broadcasts
to nuisance law: "The law of nuisance does not say. . . that no one shall maintain a pigsty; it
simply says that no one shall maintain a pigsty in an inappropriate place. ... Id.
101. See note 52 supra.
102. The Commission's Pacifica opinion referred variously to "times of the day when
there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience," 56 F.C.C.2d at 98 (footnote
omitted); times "[wihen the number of children in the audience is reduced to a minimum, for
example during the late evening hours," id.; and simply "the late evening hours," id. at 100.
103. Judge Tamm cited studies showing "that large numbers of children are in the broad-
cast audience until 1:30 a.m." 556 F.2d at 13-14. As Judge Bazelon noted, the effect of the
order was to make the material unavailable to adults with normal sleeping habits. Id. at 19-20,
27 (Bazelon, C.S., concurring). The severity of this burden on the speech distinguishes Pacifica
from Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). In that case the Supreme
Court upheld a restriction on the location of "adult" movie theaters. The challenged ordinance
burdened speech only slightly because the theaters retained adequate opportunities to enter the
market. Id. at 62.
104. 390 U.S. at 639.
105. Id. The Court distinguished between imposing morality on the child and supporting
the parent's right to'decide what the child would see. Id. at 639 n.7 (quoting Henkin, Morals
and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 391, 413 n. 68 (1963)).
106. Id. at 639.
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affirming the conviction in Ginsberg-the state's independent interest in the
welfare of childrent 7-may well be inapplicable to cases involving offen-
sive but nonobscene speech. This state interest was held to justify the
prohibition because the legislature could rationally find pornography to be
harmful to children. 108 The evidence cited in Ginsberg, however, concerned
only the effects of material that appealed to the prurient interest; it is not
clear that the FCC could rationally find any danger in material that lacked
this element of obscenity.'t 9 Furthermore, the magazines in Ginsberg
concededly had no redeeming social importance for minors. 110 Ginsberg
does not hold that it is rational to find material harmful to minors while
ignoring any value that it has for them.
The preceding discussion has distinguished Ginsberg from Pacifica on
the assumption that print media distribute obscene material discretely. An
adult purchaser of a book or magazine, however, may reconvey it to a child.
The Supreme Court has taken note of this " 'outside business' in these
materials" 111 and has drawn the conclusion that they cannot be kept out of
the hands of children once they are sold. This suggests an inconsistency
between Ginsberg and Butler: the state interests that supported the law
upheld in Ginsberg1 2 would also be served by the law struck down in
Butler.
There are two theories on which these cases might be reconciled. The
first is that an adult's interest in receiving the material always outweighs the
state's interest in keeping it from children."t 3 Censorship of speech that is
not obscene for adults is constitutional only if no adult's rights are affected.
This interpretation would limit permissible censorship of such speech to
cases in which a minor was the only recipient of the material. Censorship of
107. Id. at 640.
108. Id. at 639, 641.
109. Regulation of obscene material is frequently defended on the ground that consumers
of such material may be moved by it to commit antisocial sexual acts. See, e.g., Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 n.8 (1973). This danger would presumably be absent if the
material were completely nonsexual.
110. See 390 U.S. at 635.
I 1. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 n.7 (1973). See also United States v. 12
200-Ft. Reels of Super 8Mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 129 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115,
120 (1973). All three of these cases involved materials that were obscene for both adults and
children.
112. See text accompanying notes 104-08 supra.
113. See Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 7, for a
similar interpretation of Butler. There might be an exception to this principle when children are
both the intended and the primary audience of the broadcast. In Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S.
502 (1966), the Court allowed a jury to determine the obscenity vel non of the material with
reference to a special group (homosexuals) rather than to the general population, when the
material was "designed for and primarily disseminated to" that group. Id. at 508. Judge
Leventhal, by contrast, would consider the presence of children in the audience if the broadcast
were "geared to children-or [if] . . .a substantial number of children are likely to be in the




nonobscene broadcasting, therefore, would never be allowed. The other
reading of Butler and Ginsberg is that, although a state may protect
children, it may do so only by acting against the person who directly
conveys unsuitable material to a child. Earlier links in the chain of distribu-
tion may not be made unlawful, because no children are affected by them.
This interpretation would allow censorship of broadcasting because the
broadcaster himself takes the last step and reaches children directly.
The language used in the Butler and Ginsberg opinions suggests that
the Court was acting on the first of these two theories. Had the Butler Court
been following the second theory, it would have justified the reversal of the
conviction on the ground that the law did not serve the state interest (because
defendant bookseller was not the person who had directly conveyed any
material to children). Instead, it reasoned that the Michigan law was not the
least restrictive means of achieving the state's goal because it infringed on
the first amendment rights of adults. 114 Similarly, the Ginsberg Court could
have distinguished Butler on the ground that the defendant newsdealer in
Ginsberg had himself sold pornography to a minor. In fact, however, the
Court distinguished the statute on the ground that the New York law
challenged in Ginsberg did not prohibit sales to adults. 115 In Pacifica, Judge
Tamm"1 6 and Chief Judge Bazelon 17 appeared to follow the Supreme Court
in adopting the first theory, while the FCC 18 and Judge Leventhal' 9 acted
on the second.
In addition to its expressed desire to protect children from offensive
language, the FCC has argued, in Pacifica120 and other cases, 121 that
broadcasting is properly subject to stricter regulation because of its intrusive
nature. A broadcast can reach unconsenting adults who did not know what
they would hear when they tuned in to the program. Because this intrusion
occurs in the home, the privacy interest involved is especially important. A
case frequently cited by the FCC to support media content regulation is
Rowan v. United States Post Office Department.1 22 The Supreme Court in
Rowan held it constitutionally permissible for the Post Office to honor
postal patrons' requests that they not receive mail containing sexually
explicit advertising.123 The Court gave as one of its reasons the importance
114. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
115. 390 U.S. at 634-35.
116. See 556 F.2d at 17.
117. See id. at 27-28 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
118. See 56 F.C.C.2d at 97.
119. See 556 F.2d at 36 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
120. 56 F.C.C.2d at 98-99.
121. See, e.g., WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d at 411.
122. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
123. The Post Office does so under 39 U.S.C. § 3008 (1970).
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of protecting the individual's right to be free of unwelcome intrusions in the
home. 1
24
Rowan does provide some support for the FCC's position with respect
to broadcast media. The intrusion on privacy was only fleeting, as the
recipient could discard the offensive mail upon realizing its nature;
nevertheless, the interest in not receiving it at all was held sufficient to
justify the statute. This interest is similar to the interest of a dial-scanner in
not hearing a single vulgar word. The major difficulty in applying Rowan to
broadcasting is the distinction between the discrete and the indiscrete distri-
bution of obscene or other offensive material. The mail is a discrete
medium, so the enforcement of the statute on behalf of those postal patrons
offended by the advertisements posed no threat to others' first amendment
interests in being able to receive such material.
The Supreme Court has considered the problem of invasion of privacy
through indiscrete media in two important cases. Appellant in Cohen v.
California'25 had entered the Los Angeles County Courthouse wearing a
jacket inscribed "Fuck the Draft." His conviction on a charge of disturbing
the peace was reversed. In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville126 the owner of
a drive-in movie theater had been forbidden to show movies including any
nudity, even if the movies were not obscene, because the screen was visible
from the public highway. This municipal ordinance was held unconstitution-
al. 127 In each case the Court held that the appellant's activities were protect-
ed by the first amendment, although recognizing that there was a danger that
the "speech" might reach the eyes of people who would find such expres-
sion offensive. 128 Balancing these interests, the Court held the former to be
greater, especially since the offended, onlookers could protect their privacy
by averting their eyes. 129 By analogy, an offended recipient of a radio or
television program can "avert his ears" by turning the dial.
Judge Leventhal rejected this analogy on the ground that, in both
Cohen and Erznoznik, no one was offended except in a public place. 130 He
accepted the FCC's argument that broadcasts of indecent language reach
124. 397 U.S. at 736-37.
125. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
126. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
127. Id. at 217. In addition, the city was barred from ordering the owner to build fences to
block the view. See id. at 211 n.8.
128. See 422 U.S. at 212; 403 U.S. at 22.
129. The Court in Cohen held that the state could prevent intrusions only when "substan-
tial privacy interests [were] being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner." 403 U.S. at 21.
Because offended onlookers could be free of the intrusion simply by averting their eyes, Cohen
was not such a case. Id. Nor was Erznoznik, for the same reason. 422 U.S. at 211-12.
130. 556 F.2d at 33 (Leventhal, J., dissenting). Cohen specifically acknowledged the
greater privacy interest in being free from unwanted expression in the home. 403 U.S. at 21-22.
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people in their homes, where their interest in privacy is entitled to greater
protection. It is true that, while in their homes, people usually expect to be
relatively unaffected by events in the outside world, but a broadcast inter-
feres with no one who does not take affirmative steps to receive it. When
someone in a house does turn on a radio or television set, he does so for the
precise purpose of being affected by the outside world. It seems most
reasonable to say that to turn on a radio or television set is to enter a public
"place," no matter where the set happens to be located. 131 Modern technol-
ogy makes it possible to leave one's home without leaving the house.
Under this analysis, broadcasting is not similar to the sound truck
blaring in the street. 132 A better analogy would be to a person living across
the street from the Los Angeles County Courthouse, who complained that,
by standing on a chair and looking through a window with a pair of
binoculars, he could see through the courthouse window and read the
lettering on Cohen's jacket. His argument that the privacy of his home had
been invaded would not be accepted, even though the offensive speech did
enter his home. The very purpose of his action was to overcome the barrier
placed between him and the world by the walls of his house. Having thus
voluntarily exposed himself to a public place, he must take the conse-
quences.
Given that the airwaves constitute a public "place" in some sense of
that term, it is for the government to decide what sort of place it should be.
Under some circumstances a municipality may, to preserve the peaceful
character of a public park, ban all speeches and rallies in it. 133 This kind of
131. See Pacifica, 556 F.2d at 17; id. at 26-27 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring); Note, Filthy
Words, the FCC, and the First Amendment: Regulating Broadcast Obscenity, 61 VA. L. REV.
579, 618 (1975). The FCC has drawn a distinction between the continuing affirmative steps
required by one reading a book (the reader must continue reading and turning pages) and the
single affirmative step required by broadcast media (the listener may turn a radio or television
set on and then do nothing more). See, e.g., 556 F.2d at 33 (Leventhal, J., dissenting); WUHY-
FM, 24 F.C.C.2d at 411. It is not clear why the Commission considers this distinction to be of
any importance. Even the listener has taken an affirmative step. Conceivably the FCC is
concerned with protecting the right of an individual to give his consent to the intrusion and then
withdraw that consent without having to turn the set off. Cf. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082,
1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969) (broadcast messages may have
greater impact than written ones because an habitual watcher must take affirmative action to
avoid them).
132. Those offended by sound trucks in residential areas could not avert their ears. See
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. at 21.
133. See generally Note, The Public Forum: Minimum Access, Equal Access, and the First
Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REV. 117 (1975) and sources cited therein.
In addition to arguing that broadcasting is intrusive, the FCC has sought to distinguish it
from other media by citing the scarcity of spectrum space. See, e.g., Pacifica, 56 F.C.C.2d at
97. The Supreme Court has relied on this factor in holding that broadcast speech is entitled to
less first amendment protection than is printed speech. Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (not unconstitutional to require broadcasters to provide equal time to
opposing views), with Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (similar law
applied to newspapers is unconstitutional). Scarcity poses the danger that important points of
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censorship promotes the public use of the park. The FCC has made an
analogous argument for its regulation of offensive broadcasts, arguing that,
if indecent language became widespread,
it would drastically affect the use of radio by millions of people. No
one could ever know, in home or car listening, when he or his
children would encounter what he would regard as the most vile
expressions serving no purpose but to shock, to pander to sen-
sationalism. Very substantial numbers would either curtail using
radio or would restrict their use to but a few channels or frequen-
cies, abandoning the present practice of turning the dial to find
some appealing program.
134
As an empirical prediction, this seems dubious. The FCC received no
complaints about the interview in the WUHY case, 135 the broadcast of
which raised this specter in the Commission's deliberations. The Carlin
monologue in Pacifica drew one complaint. 136 In neither WUHY nor
Pacifica did the Commission provide any evidence to substantiate its
fears. 1
37
Even if the FCC is correct on this point, it has established only that
society would be better off if the public "place" of the airwaves were
regulated to remove this danger, not that such regulation would be constitu-
tional. The Court in Cohen said that the strongest argument for upholding
the conviction was "that the States, acting as guardians of public morality,
may properly remove this offensive word from the public vocabulary." 1
38
This is a policy consideration similar to the FCC's asserted role as guardian
view will not be aired. For this reason, Commissioner Johnson has adhered to a distinction
between affirmative obligations (e.g., Red Lion) and negative prohibitions, arguing that only
the former serve to increase the diversity of programming. See Apparent Liability of Station
WGLD-FM, 41 F.C.C.2d 919, 921-22 (1973) (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting in Sonderling). The
Court in Red Lion agreed that prohibitions were harder to justify. See 395 U.S. at 396. See also
Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100 n.76 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
134. WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d at 411.
135. Id. at 409 n.2.
136. 556 F.2d at 11. See also Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 41 F.C.C.2d 777, 780 n.10
(1973) (Commission denies reconsideration of its earlier decision, 27 RADIO REC. 2d (P & F) 285
(1973), discounting claim of public opposition to censorship because it has received "only" four
complaints about the earlier decision).
137. Even without FCC censorship, economic factors would severely limit offensive
broadcasts. See 556 F.2d at 18; WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d at 421 (Cox, Comm'r, concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Note, supra note 131, at 615. The Supreme Court has upheld an
ordinance requiring the dispersal of "adult" movie theaters, but only after determining that
there was a factual basis for the city's justification for controlling them. Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976).
The Court in American Mini Theatres also distinguished that case from Erznoznilk. In
Erznoznik Jacksonville's goal was to prevent the dissemination of offensive speech, while in
American Mini Theatres Detroit sought to prevent the "secondary effect[s]" of clusters of
"adult" theaters. Id. at 71 n.34. The FCC could argue that public abandonment of dial-scanning
is such a secondary effect, but the effect is linked to the offensiveness of the speech to some
citizens. American Mini Theatres included in its list of secondary effects the attraction of
undesirables to the area and an increase in the crime rate. See id. at 55.
138. 403 U.S. at 22-23.
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of the public airwaves. Nevertheless, the Court in Cohen rejected this
justification for censorship. Freedom of speech, it said, also includes offen-
sive speech, and putting up with the latter is the price that must be paid for
the former. 139
The Court in Miller reaffirmed the holding in Roth that the first
amendment does not protect obscene speech-a position that has been
vigorously disputed on both sides."4° Nevertheless, the Burger Court has
shown no willingness to create another category of unprotected speech.
Rowan demonstrated the Court's concern for the unconsenting adult, but the
Court has elswhere noted that " '[t]he radio can be turned off. .... , "141
Erznoznik demonstrated that the goal of protecting children from offensive
material will not be allowed to override the first amendment interests of
adults. On the basis of these precedents, it seems unlikely that the FCC will
be successful in its attempts to sanitize the language used in some of our
most important public fora-the broadcast media.
JAMES M. LANE
Federal Jurisdiction-Vendo Co. v. Lektro- Vend Corp.:
The Interface of the Clayton Act and the Anti-Injunction Act
In Vendo Co. v. Lektro- Vend Corp.,I the United States Supreme Court
had, and failed to take advantage of, the opportunity to define more clearly
the exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283,2 which
prohibits the enjoining of state court proceedings. Specifically, the Court
had before it the issue whether section 16 of the Clayton Act,3 which
139. Id. at 24-26.
140. See generally Symposium, Obscenity and the Law, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1275 (1977).
141. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974) (quoting Packer Corp. v.
Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932)).
1. 97 S. Ct. 2881 (1977).
2. "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
3. Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C.A. § 26 (West Cum. Supp. 1977), provides in pertinent
part:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have
injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties,
against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws, including
sections 13, 14, 18, and 19 of this title, when and under the same conditions and
principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage
is granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings, and upon
the execution of proper bond against damages for an injunction improvidently granted
and a showing that the danger of irreparable loss or damage is immediate, a prelimi-
nary injunction may issue . . ..
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